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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Supreme Court, while recognizing the legality of suspending
sentence, has not commended the practice, 15 but has indicated that
evils would result from its indiscriminate use.16 With the law governing the suspended sentence in its present state there is no assurance
either to the community or to the convicted that under given circumstances sentence will be suspended, or on what conditions, or for what
period, or that on a breach of condition the offender will be disciplined. The instant case suggests the need of a definite system of
regulations designed to carry out the purpose of the suspended sentence, and to minimize the likelihood of its abuse.

W. T. COVINGTON, JR.
Damages-Carriers-Measure of Damages for Loss of Small
Part of Shipment in Bulk
In a recent case the facts showed that the plaintiff purchased a
carload of coal, while in transit. On arrival at destination there was
a shortage of 5,500 pounds. At the time of arrival, plaintiff had not
sold any of the coal. The shortage did not interfere with the maintenance of his usual stock, and no sales were lost as a result of it.
The plaintiff did not go into the retail market to replace the shortage.
Held, that the measure of damages was the wholesale price.1
It is the avowed aim of the courts in actions founded on contract
to place the party injured in as good position pecuniarily as he would
have occupied had the breach not occurred,2 and damages are
awarded, in the absence of special circumstances with this principle
in mind.
The pertinent statutory expression is found in the so-called Cummins Act 3 which provides that the holder of a bill of lading for interstate rail shipment is entitled to recover for the "full actual loss" to
his property. By jfudicial interpretation this has come to mean that
such loss is to be ascertained with reference to the value at point of
destination. 4
'

State v. Hatley, supra note 8.

"State v. Griffis, supra note 7; State v. Hilton, 151 N. C. 687, 65 S.E.

1011 (1909) ; State v. Everett, supra note .10.
'Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Crail, 50 Sup. Ct. 180 (1930).
'Seaboard Air Line R. R. v. U. S., 261 U. S.299, 43 Sup. Ct. 354, 67 L. ed.

664 (1922).

'34 Stat. 593, 49 U. S. C. A. §20 (11).
"Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore

504, 64 L. ed. 801 (1919).

Co., 253 U. S.97, 40 Sup. Ct.
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Varying conceptions of "value" are to be encountered in the
decisions. In general the rule is that value must be determined with
reference to the quantity involved, and may not be determined with
reference to a larger quantity.6 This would seem to mean that if
goods are bought in large quantities, the market price at retail is not
the standard, but the market price at wholesale. 6
Conversely, when it is sought to ascertain the value of goods in
small quantities, or of a single chattel, (regardless, apparently, of the
fact that it may have been one of a large number of like chattels, e.g.,
the deliberate conversion of one article from the stock of a wholesale establishment) ordinarily the measure of damages is the retail
price.1
The trend of decision is toward holding that where the consignee
is under reasonable compulsion to re-purchase at retail rates to meet
outstanding demands, the measure of damages should be based on
retail rates.8 However, this case is clearly out of that category. To
allow the use of the latter standard would be to include all overhead
expense of marketing at retail, such as clerk hire, rent, and bad debts,
none of which had been incurred with regard to the shipment in
question.9
The present decision satisfies the common law principle of full
compensation for injuries received, at the same time bearing out the
'Bagley v. Findlay, 82 Ill. 524 (1876); James H. Rice Co. v. Penn Plate
Glass Co., 117 Ill.
App. 356 (1904); Grand Tower Co. v. Phillips, 90 U. S.

471, 23 L. ed. 71 (1874), in which it is declared that "the true rule would seem

to be to allow the plaintiffs to show the price they would have had to pay for
coal in the quantities which they were entitled to receive it under the contract."
Compare this statement from Heidritter Lumber Co. v. Central R. R. of N. J.,
100 N. J.L. 402, 122 Atl. 691 (1923), "the plaintiff was entitled to replace the

coal at its value at destination because the quantity that was lost could not be
-bought at wholesale rates anywhere." It did not appear in this case that the
plaintiff was compelled to -purchase in the retail market to meet outstanding

contract.
14 SUTHERLAND ON

DAMAGES (4th ed.) §1098, p. 4178; Wendnagel v.
Houston, 155 Ill. App. 664 (1910).
'1 SEDGWICK ON DAMAGES (9th ed.) §248a, p. 500; SUTHERLAND ON
DAMAGES, supra note 6. Compare: ". . . where part of a stock of goods is
converted, the value of the goods in the retail market is not the measure of
damages in an action of trover." Sedgwick, supra.
'Cobb v. Illinois C. R. Co., 39 Iowa 601 (1874); Bridgman v. The Emily,

18 Iowa 510 (1865); Kyle v. Laurens R. Co., 44 S. C. L. 382, 70 Am. Dec.
231 (1857).
' SUTHERLAND ON DAMAGES, supra note 6. See opinion of Cant, District
Judge, in Crail v. Illinois Cent. P. Co., 21 F. (2d) 836 (D. C. Minn. 1927).
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statutory requirement that awards are to be made for actual loss
suffered.1 0
T. J. GoLD, JR.
Mortgages-Tenancy in Common-Right to Improvements
In the case of Layton v. Byrd1 the defendant had purchased a
tract of land from three tenants in common, A, B, and C. The interests
of B and C were unencumbered, that of A was subject to a mortgage to T, unknown to the defendant. Defendant before foreclosure
by T, and after purchase from A, B, and C, made permanent improvements on the land. Plaintiff sub'sequently purchased the onethird undivided interest formerly owned by A at foreclosure sale
by T. In a bill for partition by plaintiff, Held, The rule entitling
the tenant in common to the value of his improvements on partition 2
is inapplicable, the rule that improvements made on mortgaged lands
by the mortgagor or one claiming under him inure to the benefit of
the mortgagee3 must be applied, and the plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate part of the improvements.
The court reaches its conclusion on the reasoning that, at the time
the improvements were put upon the land, there was no tenancy in
common in existence, but the land was held by Byrd, defendant, as
sole owner. Consequently, since there was no co-tenant against
whom he could assert his equity the tenant in common rule cannot
0

Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489, 23 L. ed. 374 (1875) ;
(1920) §1338. Several cases have recognized the

WMLISTON ON CONTRACTS

anomalous but equitable doctrine tthat occasionally the measure of damages
cannot be determined by reference to either the wholesale or retail price. See
Clark v. Parsons, 109 Mo. App. 432, 84 S. W. 1019 (1905). Thus in the United
States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341, 43 Sup. Ct. 565, 67 L. ed.
1014 (1923) it was held that where coal was appropriated by the government,
and where there was a free market for export coal, and the coal could have
been sold in such market, the owner was entitled to the export price, although
this was higher than domestic rates.
1198 N. C. 466, 152 S. E. 161 (1930).
'If one tenant in common makes improvements on the common property
he will be entitled upon partition to the value of his share in the land in its
unimproved condition and the value of the improvements, if this can be done
without prejudice to his co-tenants. Pope v. Whitehead, 68 N. C. 191 (1873) ;
Collett v. Henderson, 80 N. C. 337 (1879) ; Fisher v. Toxaway Co., 171 N. C.
547, 88 S. E. 887 (1916) ; see Note (1919) 1 A. L. R. 1189; Bayley v. Nichols,
263 Ill. 116, 104 N. E. 1054 (1914); Crafts v. Crafts, 13 Gray 360 (Mass.
1859); Fenton x.. Miller, 116 Mich. 45, 72 Am. St. Rep. 502, 74 N. W. 384

(1898).

' Wharton v. Moore, 84 N. C. 479 (1881); Belvin v. Raleigh Paper Co.,
123 N. C. 138, 31 S. E. 655 (1898) ; see also Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 601.

